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Note: The Burlingion Northern Merger
I. INTRODUCTION
A great increase in merger activity among the nation's rail-
roads has occurred in the past several years. Unlike the mergers
of expansion typical in many other industries, however, these
rail mergers have been intended to scale down the now un-
wieldy railroad companies into manageable, efficient units. Spe-
cifically, rail mergers have been used to facilitate contraction of
investment, reduction in facilities and, in many cases, decreases
in service. The foremost recent example of such an attempt is
the 1970 merger of several northwestern railroads into the Bur-
lington Northern.' This Note will consider that merger as part
of the phenomenon of recent rail merger activity and as a stand-
ard for future mergers in the industry. It also will consider the
rationale of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the United
States Supreme Court in approving that merger, particularly in
the context of determining the role competition should play in
the ultimate consideration of merger in the rail industry.
U. TEE PROBLEM OF OVERINVESTMENT
The American railroad industry underwent much of its
growth and development in the last half of the Nineteenth Cen-
tury, a period of tremendous territorial and industrial expansion.
Indeed, the development of new industrial centers and the ex-
pansion of the rail industry were each very much a cause and
effect of the other.2 Additionally, the railroads developed as
the sole form of effective, large scale transportation. Without
the rigors of competition from other modes of transportation,
and aided by public subsidies in a variety of forms, the railroads
engaged in a fierce competitive effort to expand their services
1. Hereinafter referred to as the "BN." The Northern Pacific
Railway will hereinafter be referred to as the "Northern Pacific"; the
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad, as the "Burlington"; the
Great Northern Railway Company as the "Great Northern"; the Seattle,
Portland, and Spokane Railroad as the "SP&S"; the Chicago, Milwau-
kee and St. Paul Railway as the "Milwaukee"; the Chicago and
Northwestern Railroad as the "Northwestern."
2. See P. LOCKn, EcoNo~ucs OF TRANSPORTATION 84-114 (1966),
for a general history of the growth of the railroad industry. See also
R. SAmiEsox & M. FAlms, Do1wmsTIc TRANSPORTATION 23-28 (1966), where
the correlative development of the rail industry and the economy as a
whole is discussed briefly.
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into as many of the new markets as possible.3 As the infant
trucking industry began to compete with the railroads for freight
business after World War I, the rails increasingly lost the reve-
nues necessary to support what had already become a greatly
overbuilt plant.
4
Under the pressures of a competitive market, the railroads
could be expected to contract plant and eliminate unprofitable
service through line abandonments, and to follow a "lowest pos-
sible price" policy in order to stimulate demand and thereby
increase revenue. However, the rail industry is regulated by
the Interstate Commerce Commission 5 under a scheme which pre-
vents effective price cutting and disallows most service reduc-
tions and plant contractions.6 As a result, railroads are forced
3. The overbuilding and overcapitalization arising out of the era
of railroad dominance is documented in P. LOCKLIN, supra note 2, at
112-14, 308; R. SAMPSON & M. FARRIS, supra note 2 at 26-28. The effect
of this overbuilding and overcapitalization is discussed in M. CONANT,
RALIROAD MERGERS AND ABANDONMENTS 1-24 (1964). See also G. KOLKO,
RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1-44 (1965).
4. M. CONANT, supra note 3, at 19-21, points out that there is sub-
stantial evidence of overinvestment in the rail industry. He asserts
that prior to the emergence of effective intermodal competition, i.e.,
competition between the railroads and other transportation modes, such
as trucks, overbuilt rail systems could be profitable, especially in light
of a regulatory policy that guaranteed a return on all investments.
Pressure from competing modes since the 1920's has increasingly cut
into rail dominance; excess capacity in the rail industry, he concludes,
will eventually lead to the bankruptcy of the roads.
5. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). The Interstate
Commerce Commission is hereinafter referred to as the "Commission."
6. The Commission was created in 1887 to regulate the monopolis-
tic railroad industry and was empowered to establish rates, prevent
personal discrimination and long haul/short haul rate variation. The
Commission's authority was periodically extended. Passage of the
Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 481 (1920), hereinafter the "1920
Act," added additional powers. For a detailed discussion of these, see
R. SAMPSON & M. FARRIS, supra note 2, at 250-58. The basic outline of
the present state of regulation of the rail industry is summarized in id.
at 258-59:
Elements of Transportation Monopoly Control
Rates and Discrimination Elements
1. All rates must be just and reasonable; all unjust and un-
reasonable rates are illegal. The I.C.C. has power to deter-
mine reasonableness and prescribe maximum and mini-
mum rates.
2. All shippers must be treated equally if they have similar
transportation circumstances and conditions (no personal
discrimination).
3. All undue preference and prejudice to any person, locality,
or type of traffic is illegal (broad discrimination prohibi-
tion).
4. A carrier may not charge more for a short haul than for a
long haul where the short is included in the long haul
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to divert revenue from service improvements to the operation
of uneconomic routes.7 The resulting deterioration in rail serv-
ice has prompted growing numbers of shippers to turn to alter-
native means of transportation, thus further decreasing revenue
available for the maintenance and improvement of service.8
over the same line and in the same direction. Exceptions
allowed by petition.
5. Rates must be published and available to all No deviation
from the published rate is allowed under penalty of law.
Rebates and passes illegal (except for certain exceptions
relative to passes).
6. The general level of rates for carriers as a group are to be
so established as to allow the carrier to earn a fair rate
of return on a fair value. Excessive individual carrier
earnings are to be recaptured in part and made available
as loans to carriers earning less than the determined fair
level
7. Rates may be suspended for a limited time while they are
being investigated.
8. A carrier may not carry its own products in competition
with other shippers (except lumber).
9. Commodity classification procedures may be controlled by
the I.C.C.
10. Intrastate rates may be raised so as not to discriminate
against interstate commerce.
Service Elements
1. Car service rules must be formulated, filed, and approved
by the I.C.C. The Commission may control car movement
in emergencies.
2. The I.C.C. may establish through routes and joint rates.
3. The Commission may order joint use of terminals.
4. All abandonments and extensions must be approved by
the I.C.C.
5. All pooling or combination must be approved by the I.C.C.(after both were illegal per se for some time).
6. Labor disputes must progress through a complicated series
of time-consuming administrative procedures in an effort
to effect settlement of industrial conflict without work
stoppage.
Security and Financial Elements
1. All accounts must be uniform and open for inspection.
2. Periodic and detailed financial reports must be rendered.
3. The I.C.C. may divide revenues from joint rates with the
needs of carriers as a standard.4. All changes in capital structure and the issuance of securi-
ties must be approved by the Commission.
5. All reorganization and bankruptcy must be approved by
the I.C.C. A special procedure is established to facilitate
restoration of the carrier to sound financial health.
6. All consolidations and mergers must fit a master plan
and have I.C.C. sanction (after being absolutely illegal
for a period of time).
7. The railroads are forced to operate lines that fail to supply
sufficient revenue to meet day-to-day operating costs of the line. Defi-
cits must be made up from other revenues, but this depletion uses
much of the money that would be available for capital improvements
that would result in new technologies. M. CoNA ,, supra note 3, at 116.
8. L CoNANT, supra note 3, at 36-40, discusses the interplay of
poor capital structure, regulatory constraints, low profits and lack of
competitive incentive. The result is described as an industry seri-
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The railroads are also burdened with substantial overinvest-
ment in plant and equipment.9 Given this physical structure
and the regulatory restraints under which they operate, the lines
are turning to mergers as a method of achieving reduced costs
and increased revenue, thereby leading to service improvements
and hopefully resulting in the ultimate revitalization of the in-
dustry as a competitor to other modes of transportation.
III. HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUENT LINES
AND THE MERGER
The Burlington Northern was a result of the 1970 merger of
the Great Northern Railway Company, the Northern Pacific
Railroad and the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad. In
conjunction with the merger, the new line also entered into a
long-term lease agreement with the Seattle, Portland and Spo-
kane Railroad, the stock of which was jointly owned by the
Great Northern and Northern Pacific prior to merger.10 The
oldest and largest of the participants was the Burlington, which
traces its origins to the Aurora Branch Railroad founded in
1849. At the time of the merger, the Burlington had nearly
10,000 miles of track extending from the Great Lakes to the Rock-
ies and from there to the Gulf of Mexico. The Great Northern,
Minnesota's oldest railroad, was formed in 1862. In 1870, the line
was purchased by a group headed by James J. Hill and eventu-
ally expanded to a transcontinental line. The Northern Pacific,
the recipient of vast federal land grants, was founded in 1873
and was the first of the Northern Lines to reach the coast.
The Great Northern and Northern Pacific have a long his-
tory of attempted merger. After the Panic of 1873 forced the
Northern Pacific into receivership, Hill attempted to purchase
the line, but the acquisition was held by the Supreme Court to
be in violation of a Minnesota statute prohibiting the merger or
consolidation of parallel lines.'1 The two lines were actually, if
ously overbuilt, operating under a regulatory system designed for a
monopoly, unable to yield reasonable profits because of inefficiencies,
and unable to afford the investment in improvements that would allow
it to be more efficient, which, in turn, impairs its competitive ability
vis a vis other transport modes.
9. M. CONANT, supra note 3, at 17-24.
10. The map reproduced as Figure 1, printed with the permission
of Burlington Northern, Inc., portrays the extent of the coverage of
service after the merger. For a complete history of the constituent
lines, see Burlington Northern's Predecessors (1971) (Burlington
Northern Public Relations-Advertising Department Press Release).
11. Pearsall v .Great Northern Ry., 161 U.S. 646 (1896).
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fleetingly, merged in 1901 when the stock of both lines was pur-
chased by the Northern Securities company, a New Jersey hold-
ing company. Although the purchase was invalidated by the
Supreme Court under the Sherman Act,12 dissolution of the
holding company did not actually result in a return to two
wholly independent railroads because the stock of the lines was
redistributed such that individuals who possessed only Great
Northern or Northern Pacific stock prior to the creation of the
holding company received shares in both companies. Thus what
was probably an oversight in the Court's decree had the effect
12. Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
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of creating a community of interest and a community of owner-
ship in the two Northern Lines which was to last until the time
of the recent merger.13  The companies recognized this
community of interest and in 1903 each purchased 46.7% of the
stock of the Burlington. In 1905, the lines jointly constructed
the Seatle, Portland and Spokane Railroad, which is now leased
by the Burlington Northern. Subsequently, merger of the two
Northern Lines was contemplated by the Commission's consoli-
dation plan developed under the Transportation Act of 1920,1"
but was conditioned upon divestiture of ownership of the Bur-
lington-a condition the Great Northern and Northern Pacific
were unwilling to accept.'5
Although the merger of the constituent lines of the Burling-
ton Northern Railroad was not accomplished until March 5,
1970, active preparation for the merger began in 1957 when the
Northern Pacific and Great Northern jointly commissioned the
consulting firm of Wyer, Dick and Company to study the feasi-
bility and estimated cost savings which would result from
merger. As a result of that study, the firm presented a Report
on the Economics of Proposed Consolidation'" which estimated
that savings resulting from the proposed merger would run as
high as $46,479,246 annually for the first five years after
merger.1'7 On the basis of this report, the lines entered into ex-
13. The stock was distributed such that one who had owned one
per cent of the stock in one of the railroads before the merger, and
then, hypothetically, one third of one per cent of the stock of the hold-
ing company, received on dissolution not the original one per cent of
the railroad he had owned, but rather one third of one per cent of the
stock of each of the roads. He thus had the same actual ownership in
the lines after divesture as he had during the life of the holding com-
pany, but was deprived of the benefits of a single management. At the
time of divesture, this common ownership existed in over 90% of the
Northern Pacific stock and over 75% of the Great Northern stock. At
the time of the merger in 1970, over 60% of the stock of each line was
still owned in common. Interview with Burlington Northern Manage-
ment Representative, in St. Paul, Minn., February 10, 1972 [hereinafter
cited as "BN Interview"].
14. The 1920 Act called upon the Commission to draw up a master
plan for national rail consolidation which was to establish a limited
number of competitive rail systems. The plan, however, was voluntary
and never achieved success. Not completed until 1929, the plan was
doomed to failure at the outset because it offered nothing of value to
strong railroads. Moreover, the plan did not strike at the heart of the
growing rail inefficiency brought about by the duplication of facilities.
M. CONANT, supra note 3, at 49-50.
15. M. CONANT, supra note 3, at 51.
16. The report, hereinafter referred to as the "Wyer Report," was
issued on December 1, 1957.
17. Great Northern Pacific & Burlington Lines, Inc., 328 I.C.C.
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tensive negotiations which resulted in a 1960 agreement to
merge.
In 1961 the lines filed a merger application with the Inter-
state Commerce Commission pursuant to Section 5 of the Inter-
state Commerce Act.'8 The Commission appointed a hearing ex-
aminer and extensive public hearings on the proposed merger
were held in 1961-62. Although the examiner recommended ap-
proval of the merger, the Commission denied the application by
a five to four vote in its "First Report" of March 31, 1966.1' Ac-
cording to this document, the denial was based on the Commis-
sion's belief that most of the alleged savings could be achieved
without merger and that the merger would severely curtail in-
tramodal competition. The Commission concluded, therefore,
that the merger would not be "in the public interest" as required
by Section 15 (3) of the Interstate Commerce Act.
While a petition for rehearing was pending, the lines entered
into agreements with labor unions which guaranteed lifetime
employment to all employees of the constituent lines.20  Con-
temporaneously, the lines agreed to grant extensive trackage
rights2l to the Milwaukee and the Northwestern Railroads and
to grant eleven gateways22 to the Pacific coast to the Milwau-
kee.23 In exchange for these concessions, the unions and the
railroads withdrew their opposition to the merger. During this
time, a second Wyer Report was prepared considering new areas
460, 501 (1966). The constituent lines depended heavily upon the Wyer
Reports throughout the entire course of the proceedings. The Commis-
sion gave little credence to the report at the first merger hearing, but
the findings of the second Wyer report were well received. See text
accompanying notes 23-24 infra.
18. 49 U.S.C. § 5 (1961).
19. 328 I.C.C. 460 (1966). The effect upon intramodal competition
clearly dominated the Commission's decision to deny the merger appli-
cation. In the majority opinion, the loss of competition is balanced
against the savings anticipated from the merger. The dissent ex-pressed
doubts that the Milwaukee could be a viable competitor and con-
cluded that the real concern ought to be to maintain a strong rail
system on the Northern Tier to compete with the growing trucking in-
dustry.
20. 331 I.C.C. 228, 277 (1968).
21. The right of one line to send its cars on the tracks of another
line is a "trackage" right, an essential privilege for lines that wish to
carry freight from their own area of service to points in other areas.
22. Gateways are distinguishable from trackage right in that the
carrier is allowed, in return for a fee, to use the tracks of another
carrier as if they were its own. In this case, the Milwaukee achieved
access to the Pacific Northwest, and the entire West Coast by means
of these gateways.
23. Great Northern Pacific & Burlington Lines, Inc., 331 LC.C. 228,
231 (1967).
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of savings and eliminating areas of savings that could be
achieved through interline cooperation but without merger. This
report also estimated that annual savings would amount to $47
million, notwithstanding the new conditions to which the lines
had agreed.
On January 4, 1967, the Commission granted the application
for rehearing and reopened the proceedings. Although the re-
hearing was nominally a reconsideration of all issues, it was in
fact limited to the issue of savings to be realized from the pro-
posed merger in the face of the adverse economic impact of the
employee protection, gateway and trackage rights agreements.
The lines cited the findings of the second Wyer Report that new
areas of savings and inflation would offset losses from the agree-
ments. The Justice Department, certain company stockholders,
and state regulatory bodies continued to oppose the merger, but
the labor unions and other rail lines no longer offered opposition.
On November 30, 1967, the Commission approved the applica-
tion. 24
In May 1968, the Justice Department filed a complaint in
United States District Court challenging the Commission order
approving the merger. When the district court unanimously af-
firmed the Commission, 25 finding that it had not abused its ad-
ministrative discretion, the Justice Department and other inter-
ested parties appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court stated that it was in the first instance the function of the
Commission rather than the courts to determine whether the
merger was consistent with the public interest. Moreover, the
Court concluded that the Commission had properly weighed the
loss of competition among the constituent lines against the bene-
fits to be gained from the merger. The Court therefore af-
firmed the conclusion of the district court that the Commission
had not abused its administrative discretion in approving the
merger.26 As a result the merger was consumated on March 5,
1970.
IV. RELEVANT MERGER STANDARDS UNDER SECTION 5
OF THE TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1940;
ROLE OF COMPETITION
The dominance of rail transportation began to wane in the
nineteen twenties with the emergence and growth of trucking as
24. Id. at 228 (1967).
25. 296 F. Supp. 853 (D.D.C. 1968).
26. United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 396 U.S. 491
(1970).
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a more expeditious and convenient method of transportation. It
soon became apparent that unless railroad mergers and aban-
donments were regulated, many communities that relied on the
railroads for their essential transportation would be deprived of
service as the lines reduced expenses and investment in order
to meet the competition from the trucking industry.
Congress first responded to this situation through the Trans-
portation Act of 1920 which, inter alia, amended the Interstate
Comnerce Act. This Act sought to merge weaker carriers into
stronger systems and to stabilize the industry in what essen-
tially amounted to a regulated cartel 2 7 The Act further em-
powered the Commission to regulate all interstate modes of
transportation in order to foster the "inherent advantage"2 of
each mode.2 9 The Commission sought to meet its responsibilities
under the 1920 Act by promulgating a nationwide consolidation
plan.30 It became apparent, however, that the Commission's
plan was actually retarding rather than encouraging rail con-
solidations, primarily because the stronger carriers were unwill-
ing to merge with their weaker counterparts.3 1
Of prime importance to the recent rail merger phenomenon
is the Transportation Act of 1940.32 Unlike the 1920 Act, this Act
expressly recognized that one of the proper considerations in
promoting an efficient national transportation system is the re-
tention and intensification of intermodal as well as intramodal
competition:
It is hereby declared to be the national transportation policy
of Congress to provide for fair and impartial regulation of all
modes of transportation subject to the provisions of this act,
so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent ad-
vantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, economical and
faster service and foster sound economic conditions in transpor-
27. For a discussion of the 1920 Act, see P. LocKLIN, supra note 2,
at 226-39. See also notes 6 and 14 supra.
28. '"nherent advantage" is the notion that an industry, or some
sub-industry within an industry, is better able to provide some prod-
uct or service than any competing unit because of some unique char-
acteristic.
29. '"Mode" is the term used to designate a type of transportation,
such as trucking, in the larger transportation industry. The 1920 Act
was the first recognition of the need to promote each type of transpor-
tation where it offered inherent advantages over other modes. Prior to
that Act the effort had been directed toward restraining the rail monop-
oly; however, from 1920 on the realization of the demise of the rail
industry began to assert itself. See generally R. SApsoN & Mt FAMus,
supra note 2, at 253-58.
30. See note 14 supra.
31. Id.
32. 54 Stat. 899 [hereinafter referred to as "1940 Act"].
1209
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tation and among the several carriers; to encourage the es-
tablishment and maintenance of reasonable charges for trans-
portation services, without unjust discrimination, undue pref-
erences and advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive
practices; to cooperate with the several states and duly au-
thorized official thereof; and to encourage fair wages and equi-
table working conditions;-all to the end of developing, coor-
dinating, and preserving national transportation by water, high-
way, and rail, as well as other means, adequate to meet the
needs of commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service,
and of the national defense. 33
The competitive standard for evaluating mergers which has
evolved since the passage of the 1940 Act is largely a product of
case law, of which McLean Trucking Co. v. United States,3 ' is the
seminal decision. McLean involved the proposed consolidation of
eight motor carriers, all competitors with at least one of their
number, into a single company. The merged company would
have been the only trucking company with through service over
the entire Atlantic coast. Though there would then be carriers
in competition over all parts of the new route, no other single
carrier served the entire market served by the new company.
The Court found that although the merger would substantially
lessen competition, competition from other truckers would fur-
nish a sufficient incentive for providing adequate service.35 The
Court further held that mergers regulated under the Interstate
Commerce Act were exempt from antitrust considerations im-
posed upon other mergers by the Sherman and Clayton Anti-
trust Acts. Prior to McLean it was acknowledged that such
mergers were exempt from those laws, but it had been thought
that they were, nevertheless, governed by the same antitrust
considerations as other mergers. The Court in McLean recog-
nized that the situation in the transportation industry was a
unique one for which Congress had provided a unique standard
under which the activities of the nation's regulated carriers were
to be judged:
[The national transportation policy] which is the Commission's
guide to the 'public interest' . . . demands that all modes of
transportation subject to the provisions of the Interstate Com-
merce Act be so regulated as to 'recognize and preserve the in-
herent advantages of each; to promote safe, adequate, economic
service and foster sound economics in transportation and among
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
35. Id. at 71. It should be noted that the proposed merger did not
involve all the motor carriers serving that region, so that some carriers
would still exist at all points served by the new system. The system
would, however, have the obvious competitive advantage of being able
to offer through service that none of its competitors could duplicate.
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the several carriers .... 36
Antitrust standards and considerations relevant in other indus-
tries were to have no independent validity under the public in-
terest test of the 1940 Act:
The preservation of competition among carriers, although still
a value, is significant chiefly as it aids in the attainment of the
objectives of the national transportation policy.37
In Seaboard Air Line R.R. v. United States,3 8 the Court
affirmed per curiam a decision by the Commission approving
a rail merger involving a significant reduction in rail competi-
tion. Although the emerging companies were two financially
healthy, parallel railroads which prior to the merger had been
in strong competition with each other, the Commission held
that the putative benefits of improved service to shippers
would outweigh the loss of competition. It considered as well
the long term ability of the lines to maintain such competition
without a merger, citing a seven year period of declining reve-
nues and excess capacity sometimes reaching as high as 25% as
indicative of a gradual deterioration in the ability of the lines to
meet the growing competition from other transportation
modes.39 In order to offset the effect of the merger upon intra-
modal competition, it ordered certain protective conditions to in-
sure the ability of other rail lines to offer positive competition.40
However, the Commission also noted that:
With the development of intense competition in recent years
from other modes of transportation, the preservation of intra-
modal rail competition has lost much of its significance in the
furtherance of overall national transportation policy.4
36. Id. at 82.
37. Id. at 87.
38. 382 U.S. 154 (1965).
39. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 320 I.C.C. 122, 153 (1963). The simi-
larities between the Seaboard Lines and the Northern Lines cases is
compelling. In each case, the Court demonstrated a willingness to
save reasonably healthy lines from eventual deterioration; happily the
merger came in each case while there was still a workable line upon
which to build. In the case of the Penn Central, on the other hand, it
has been suggested that the merger was doomed from the outset be-
cause of the weak condition of both the Pennsylvania and the New York
Central. See generally J. DAUGHEN & P. BiNzEN, TaE WRcxc OF THE
PENN CmENRAL (1971).
40. 320 I.C.C. at 168 et seq. Here, as in the Northern Lines case,
the conditions are imposed to protect less efficient competitiors.
There seems to be a reluctance on the part of the Commission to recog-
nize the impotency of intrarail competition. The result has been pro-
tective conditions that remove some of the benefits of merger without
a corresponding long term improvement in rail competition. See dis-
cussion accompanying notes 87-121 infra.
41. 320 I.C.C. at 166.
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Thus, the Commission emphasized that the proper inquiry was
not only the effect of the merger upon intramodal competition,
but rather the effect of the merger on transportation competi-
tion in the aggregate.4 2
The Commission also noted other factors relevant to a deter-
mination of the public interest, principally a potential reduction
in fixed costs by the elimination of duplicative facilities and the
resultant effects of scale economies. 43 It also noted the forecast
improvement in service, including better schedules, increased car
supply, improved "on time" efficiency, decreased switching time
and generally improved administration and management. 4"
V. APPLICATION OF THE MERGER CRITERIA
TO BURLINGTON NORTHERN
A. INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION AND SUPREME COURT
APPROVAL
In affirming the Burlington Northern merger, the Supreme
Court considered the arguments of merger opponents that the
Commission had failed to properly apply the controlling criteria
set forth in McLean and Seaboard.45  The Court held that the
Commission had given proper consideration to all of the relevant
factors necessary for a determination of the public interest.""
1. Savings
The Commissioner and the Supreme Court accepted the rail-
roads' contention that the merger would result in a reduction of
operating costs, thereby improving the railroads' competitive po-
sition both with other rail lines and with other modes, and ul-
timately resulting in the new line's ability to attract new freight.
The first Wyer Report had estimated the savings from such con-
tractions to be $47 million annually for the first five years of
the merger.47 The Commission in its First Report had estimated
42. Id.
43. Id. at 153.
44. Id. at 160-61. It is interesting to note that these are exactly
the same areas of savings that the Commission later found in the
Northern Lines case.
45. United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 396 U.S. 491
(1970).
46. The Court stated:
[V]igorous advocacy of the divergent views on this difficult
problem has narrowed and sharpened the issues and aided the
Court in their resolution, ensuring that no factor which ought to
be considered would elude our attention.
Id. at 506.
47. For Commission review of the Wyer Report and its conclu-
sions, see 328 I.C.C. 460, 501 (1966).
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the probable annual merger related savings to be approximately
$25.5 million, including $10.5 million attributable to improving
wholly internal procedures, and $15 million attributable to con-
solidation of duplicative facilities and services.48 Upon rehear-
ing, and after the expensive employee protection agreements and
gateway and trackage concessions, the second Wyer Report esti-
mated savings of approximately $47 million annually40 while the
Commission increased its estimate of annual savings, notwith-
standing the added expenses, to $40 million dollars.5 0
The principal areas of potential cost saving were consolida-
tion of facilities, economies of scale and operational efficiencies.
The Great Northern and the Northern Pacific predicted that cost
saving would result from centralization of management, com-
munications, and purchasing and planning departments. The
lines argued that because the Great Northern and Northern Pa-
cific were parallel lines and also had common switching points,
the merger would make possible the elimination of such dupli-
cative facilities as city freight yards, switching crews and equip-
ment, maintenance facilities, abandonment of unnecessary track-
age and service and finally, a phased reduction in employment
through attrition.51 Railroad mergers involving parallel carriers
offer the greatest opportunity for service improvements since
they allow for the elimination of duplicative lines and facilities;
however, end to end mergers-such as the merger of the North-
ern Lines with the Burlington-are also a source of saving for
they permit elimination of switching points. The railroads in
the instant case contended that the Burlington Northern merger
would involve all of these service improvements because the
lines involved were both end to end and parallel.
The railroads predicted that the merger would increase oper-
ational efficiencies and introduce economies of scale, thereby re-
48. Id. at 460.
49. Id. at 504. The consolidation of management, planning, com-
munications, soliciting and billing of freight accounted for the over-
head savings. Terminals, rail switching and classification yards ac-
counted for some of the duplicative facility savings, while the use of
more efficient track grades generated most of the remaining savings in
this category. The reduction of duplicate employees from such duplica-
tive facilities was one of the greatest areas of potential savings.
50. 331 LC.C. at 236.
51. Id. at 262. The cost of the employee protection plan at the
time of the Commission approval was estimated to be $10.15 million
annually. 331 LC.C. at 277.
The company also asserted that it had actually made some of the
suggested cooperative moves outlined in the First Wyer Report with-
out the benefit of merger, and that these savings were not included in
the new estimates.
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ducing unit costs. Since the merger would have the effect of
combining the freight of the constituent lines into a single pool, 2
it was argued that the increased volume would allow the use of
more long-haul-55 and unit trains,5 4 thereby, for example, increas-
ing the number of nonstop shipments from Seattle to Chicago.
The new line would thus be able to bypass intermediate switch-
ing points, reducing both costs and delays. Another asserted
benefit of the merger would be increased car supply. The new
line would be better able to locate available cars due to new
computerized communications and accounting made feasible by
the merger, and would be freed from the reluctance of the con-
stituent carriers to part with valuable, though vacant, cars.,
Finally, it was contended that the merger would enable the lines
to consolidate outdated and duplicative yards, replacing them
with single, computerized yards which would reduce switching
time, labor costs, and intercity delay.
2. Service Benefits
The Commission and the Court also found that the merger
52. Even if freight volume were not to increase, the freight of
four lines would become the freight of one line, which would permit
the use of more composites of unit and long haul trains. Whereas in
the past, each line might have had, for example, 30 cars of freight in
Chicago bound for Minneapolis, Fargo, and Seattle, there would now
be 90 cars for each destination. Prior to the merger each line would
have composed one freight that would have stopped and switched in
Minneapolis and Fargo before reaching Seattle. Now a single train
serves each city, thus eliminating switching expenses and delays. Ob-
viously, the lines had sufficient freight for some long haul runs be-
fore the merger, but the pooled freight increased that capability, es-
pecially with respect to freight bound for smaller terminals.
53. "Long haul" and "nonstop" are used interchangeably here, and
refer to trains that can bypass intermediate points as described in note
52 supra.
54. "Unit trains" are those carrying a single commodity to or from
a single user. One example of a unit train would be a train used to
transport iron ore. Such trains are less expensive to assemble and
switch because they are nonstop and do not involve the usual amount
of work in composition. Here, as described in note 52 supra, the merger
increased the number of such expense-saving hauls.
55. Notwithstanding the fact that railroads regularly lease cars
to and from other lines, there is an understandable reluctance to part
with temporarily unused cars as a peak season approaches. The merged
company would not face that reluctance with respect to its own cars
and would therefore have more cars available at any one time. Cen-
tralized car accounting and assignment also fostered much more effi-
cient utilization of available cars. These improvements would re-
dound to the benefit of the shippers who would be more likely to have
cars available when they needed them, and would also benefit the rail-
road by increasing its ability to compete for the shipper's business and
by reducing costs and increasing profit.
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would allow the BN to improve service. Most of these im-
provements are mentioned above in conjunction with reduction
of costs. 56 The participants predicted that increased revenues
and savings in operational expenses would provide capital for
research and development of techniques to improve service.5 7
3. Intramodal Competition
The Supreme Court accepted the Commission's finding that
the merger would foster intramodal competition, a conclusion
based largely on the anticipated effect of the gateway conces-
sions granted the Milwaukee which made it a transcontinental
line. Prior to the merger, the Milwaukee lacked access to the
Pacific coast, chiefly because of the Northern Lines' control of
the SP&S.5 s Although the Milwaukee actually possessed su-
perior grades and a shorter route west of the Twin Cities, it was
never a "rate making" 59 line. The Commission and the Court
both attributed this weakness to lack of transcontinental gate-
ways and poor financial condition. The Northwestern, like the
Milwaukee, is a post merger competitor of the BN, having been
56. See note 52 supra.
57. It should be noted at this point that service improvements do
not always or necessarily mean faster service. Railroads provide mov-
ing warehouses free of charge to shippers. Sometimes it is in the ship-
pers' interest to have the railroad take longer to deliver the goods be-
cause of the shippers' need to provide warehouse space. Shippers inter-
viewed in the course of preparation of this Note stated that they some-
times routed their freight by circuitous routes in order to take advan-
tage of such free warehouse space. See note 88 infra. What was im-
portant to those shippers, however, was reliability of "on time" deliv-
ery, which the BN merger was arguably to improve.
Another related point worthy of comment, although not strictly re-
lated to the topic of this Note, is the structure of the industry which
allows shippers the opportunity to use rail cars as warehouses. Be-
sides the free space during transit, the daily demurrage charge for
unreturned cars is so low that it is often to the shippers' advantage to
retain cars rather than unload them into his warehouse. The tendency
to depend upon this auxiliary warehouse space reduces the storage
costs to the shipper and increases the capital costs to the rail industry.
The merger does not specifically resolve this problem, which is illus-
trative of the general inefficiency into which the industry has fallen.
58. The competitive position of the Milwaukee will be discussed
in detail in connection with the discussion of intramodal competition.
See text accompanying notes 107-09 infra.
59. "Rate making" designates a line whose share of the market
is large enough to allow it to alter prices confident that the other
lines would have to follow its lead or lose business. On the Northern
Tier the GN and NP were able to lower prices and force the others to
follow. The Milwaukee's share of the market and capacity are too
small to alter traffic patterns on the tier significantly. See notes 106-
111 infra.
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granted some gateways into Duluth-Superior, Nebraska and the
Dakotas. North Western operates primarily in Illinois and Wis-
consin, but was only a nominal competitor of the Burlington.
Substantial competition between the two lines was precluded
primarily by the fact that the Burlington had access to the Gulf
of Mexico and to the Pacific Northwest via the Northern Lines.
In its First Report, the Commission denied the merger apli-
cation partly because:
Neither intervenor [the Milwaukee or the North Western] is a
match in terms of size, earnings, financial strength and eco-
nomic capability. Neither can provide the quantity and quality
of service made possible by the proposed merger. In fact, if the
Milwaukee and North Western were protected only by the
standard routing conditions proposed by the applicants, the
North Western would be materially weakened and the Mil-
waukee's ability to survive would be highly doubtful. Both
the North Western and the Milwaukee now provide essential
and efficient rail service to hundreds of communities that would
not be served by the New Company.60
The Commission also considered the contentions of the applicant
lines that the crucial consideration in the merger was the impact
of competition from other modes. The Commission rejected
these arguments, stating rather that much of the freight carried
by the Northern Lines was:
* . , either substantially noncompetitive or falls in a competitive
'twilight' zone and is thus available to that mode best able to
exploit its inherent advantages of cost and service. In the
former category are heavy loading, low-value bulk commodities
and unfinished commodities in which traffic the applicants pre-
dominate. The most conspicuous example of the latter is the
traffic moving in increasing quantities under various piggyback
(trailer-on-flatcar) plans. Regardless of the type of traffic in-
volved, applicants have a decided competitive advantage in
many long haul movements. In this case, rail transportation
must be considered as a distinctive market in its own right.0 '
The Commission held that the putative service improvements
and the cost savings to the railroads were outweighed by the
reduction of competition and loss of jobs, and denied the merger
application on that basis.62
Upon reconsideration, 63 the Commission indicated that its
60. 328 I.C.C. at 481.
61. Id. at 511. See text accompanying notes 121-37 infra.
62. The Commission stated:
We conclude, therefore, that the disadvantages of an appropri-
ately conditioned merger-a drastic lessening of competition
and adverse effects on carrier employees-outweigh the bene-
fits that might be derived by applicants and the shipping
public.
328 I.C.C. at 528.
63. 331 I.C.C. 228 (1967).
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former emphasis upon the preservation of intramodal competi-
tion was not supported by existing law6 4 and that its earlier find-
ing of decreased intramodal competition was no longer a correct
statement of the actual result of the merger. In light of the new
protection provisions favoring the Milwaukee and the North
Western,65 the Commission expressed the view that the merger
would actually preserve rail competition, since without the
merger and its attendant protective conditions the Milwaukee
would be "relegate[d] ... to an increasingly marginal and
deteriorating role."66
4. Intermodal Competition
The Commission and the Court 7 agreed that except for the
north-south traffic of the Burlington, the Northern Lines are not
subject to meaningful competition from water or air carriers.
Only the trucking industry offers any substantial challenge to
the railroads in the area served by the BN. In its First Report,
the Commission expressed little concern for the threat assertedly
posed to rail freight by the trucking industry, for it found that
rail freight transportation "must be considered as a distinctive
market in its own right.16 8 In its Second Report, the Commis-
sion did not address itself to the specific impact of the trucking
industry upon the merged lines, but did recognize that the
merger would:
suitably conditioned, augur an era of increased railroad strength,
both in intermodal and intramodal competitive aspects in the
long run resulting in a benefit to, and not a burden on, com-
munities in the northern tier states.69
5. Effect on the Public in General
The Justice Department and nine states or state regulatory
agencies opposed the merger on the grounds of reduced intra-
modal competition, loss of jobs in merger related cutbacks and
the possibile loss of service to small communities due to antici-
pated abandonments made possible by the merger. However,
both the Commission and the Court found that the pressure of
intermodal competition precluded any substantial anticompeti-
tive effect. In approving the merger, the Commission also noted
64. Id. at 269-70.
65. Id. at 271-76.
66. Id. at 275.
67. 396 U.S. 491 (1970).
68. 328 I.C.C. at 511.
69. 331 I.C.C. at 284.
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that merger related abandonments, like all others, require its
approval and could thus be carefully controlled should they be
proposed. The question of employment reductions was effec-
tively removed from crucial importance with the lifetime em-
ployment protection agreements negotiated by the railroads and
the unions.
The Justice Department maintained its steadfast opposition
to the merger throughout the entire proceedings, primarily on
the grounds that a drastic reduction of intramodal competition
outweighed any benefit to be obtained by the merger, and that
any economies actually obtainable by merger could be realized
through cooperation between the constituent lines.70
B. EVALUATION
The issues underlying the positions taken by the Justice De-
partment, the Commission and the courts include the extent to
which rail mergers, and particularly the Burlington Northern
merger, are necessary to and actually do achieve cost savings;
the relative importance of preserving intramodal versus inter-
modal competition; and the extent to which the public service
and employee protection considerations should preempt cost ef-
ficiencies.
1. Cost Savings
Critical to the merit of the BN merger is the assumption
that it will result in significant cost savings. Perhaps the
strongest criticism leveled by merger opponents was that the
merger was unnecessary since the achievement of cost savings
could be realized by intracompany reorganization. Savings may
be achieved both by economies of scale and by elimination of
duplicative facilities.
a. Economies of Scale
As a firm expands, it buys in greater quantities, separates
into departments which specialize in the various aspects of pro-
duction, and purchases larger equipment capable of greater pro-
duction. The natural result of expansion is thus a reduction in
per unit costs---"economies of scale."7 1 In the case of railroads,
70. Brief for Appellant at 18 et seq., United States v. U.S. Inter-
state Commerce Comm'n, Civil No. 1132-68.
71. "The theory of economies of scale is the theory of the rela-
tionship between the scale of use of a properly chosen combination of
1218 [Vol. 57:1201
1973] THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN MERGER
economies of scale are realizable by specialization of labor and
management, long-haul trains, and the use of specialized equip-
ment.
7 2
Realization of such economies is of course not unlimited; at
some point in a firm's growth savings will begin to increase at a
decreasing rate and finally will stop altogether.7 3 Further, there
are some costs which accompany increase in size, "diseconomies
of scale,"74 of which large scale management is the most fre-
quently cited example.75 It has been asserted that real disecono-
mies begin to appear in the rail industry after a railroad grows
to 10,000 or more employees.7 6 By this standard, all three of the
major participants had reached the poinf even before the merger
at which diseconomies were due to appear.
The BN merger participants countered the pessimism of
those who argued that size would only lead to administrative un-
manageability with evidence of substantial economies and with
technological and administrative means of combatting the prob-
lems of bureaucracy. The lines argued that their unification
would indeed result in more streamlined operations and con-
sequently faster and better service to their consumers. Further,
the participants pointed to technological advances such as the
all productive services and the rate of output of the enterprise." Stig-
ler, The Economies of Scale, 1 J. LAw & EcoN. 54 (1958).
72. Specialization lies at the base of scale economies. See F.
ScH RER, IDusTRrAL AURT STRUCTURE AN EcoNo mc PmFoRmANcE
72 (1970).
73. See J. BAmN, PRICE THEORY 112 (1961); C. PHILLIPS, THE Eco-
NOMICS or REGULATION 26 (1965); F. SCHEmRER, supra note 72, at 113.
74. The point at which such diseconomies begin to manifest them-
selves may not be the same in all cases. For example, diseconomies
might appear at almost any point beyond the minimum optimal scale
or may not appear until after a substantial increase in size beyond that
point. See generally J. BAmN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (1959).
75. Id. at 113. Graphically, the appearance of managerial inef-
ficiency born out of the attainment of unmanageable size is typified by
the '" shaped long run total cost curve; the downward part of the
"U" representing the decreasing costs resulting from the large-scale
economies, while the upward part of the 'U' depicts the increases in
cost resulting from the managerial diseconomies. F. ScHERER, supra
note 72, at 75.
76. K. HEALY, THE EFFECT OF SCALE IN TH5 RAIoAD lImusTRY 3(1961). At heart of this belief is concern over the potential diseconomies
created by the additional vertical layers of operation which necessarily
result from merger and the consequent strain placed upon management
and administrative personnel. Professor Healy's choice of number of
employees as a gauge for determining when diseconomies of scale be-
gin to set in may be due to the fact that labor represents a high cost to
the industry and would therefore provide a good standard for judging
the effects of large scale operations.
1219
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
advent of computers, more precise definitions of staff functions
designed to facilitate the supply of information to the chief de-
cision makers, and the refinement of cost accounting and other
forms of budgetary control as factors which would help reduce
bureaucratic inefficiency.7 7
It appears that the merger participants were correct. Ship-
pers now report that complaints and claims are more rapidly
processed, that shipping time has been decreased, and that cars
are more readily available.78 The BN is a better managed car-
rier than were the component lines prior to merger. Moreover,
significant economies are apparently occurring. A new switching
facility in Fridley, Minnesota, enabling substantial specialization
is a principal example. However, in light of the inherent diffi-
culty in measuring economies of scale, particularly the increase
in unit and long haul traffic attributable to merger rather than
market forces, it remains to be seen whether the merger will
fulfill the promises of the participants.
b. Elimination of Duplicative Facilities
It was noted earlier that railroads have resorted to mergers
as a means of more efficient allocation of plant facilities. Merg-
ers facilitate the utilization of more efficient routes made avail-
able as a result of the mergers. Critics of the BN merger
charged that such savings would be minimal since, although the
NP and GN had parallel trackage, the lines were often more
than 100 miles apart and therefore served different customers.
Thus the only elimination of facilities would occur at common
intersection points. Further, any economically feasible track
abandonment would still be prevented by Commission control
over line abandonment. Finally, opponents argued that the
elimination of duplicative facilities could be achieved without a
merger by the use of pooling agreements or "functional merg-
ers."
While it is true that the merger has resulted in abandonment
of relatively little trackage, and that abandonments resulting
directly from the merger will probably remain at a low level,
77. Id. It may be, however, that the component lines were not as
easily classified as many of the other roads in Professor Healy's study.
This is because the largest of the lines were eastern roads, and trans-
portation growth in that part of the country has not matched that in the
midwest. It may be that had midwestern lines been considered alone,
the results of a comparison would have shown them to be at least
"not as inefficient" as their eastern counterparts.
78. See note 88 infra.
[Vol. 57:12011220
1973] THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN MERGER
it is nonetheless clear that significant economies have resulted
from elimination of duplicative facilities. Moreover, the argu-
ment in favor of "functional merger" is of little weight. While
it is probably true that many of the merger related savings in
the BN case could have been achieved through the use of pool-
ing of service agreements,'" it was highly unlikely that the
Northern Line and the Burlington would have engaged in a vol-
untary functional merger. Historically, pooling and trackage
agreements have not been widely used by the railroads. 0 Aside
from the difficulties inherent in the negotiation of such agree-
ments and in gaining requisite Commission approval" for their
operation, it may be that some sense of "company pride"8 has
retarded the railroads' use of the functional merger as a means
of attaining increased economies of operation. More importantly,
since a functional merger has many of the same competitive ef-
fects as an actual merger, it seems irrational to prohibit full con-
solidation. Finally, it appears that savings from consolidation
have to date been substantial. Merger has enabled the use of
more efficient grades, reducing fuel and maintenance; the trim-
ming of executive positions; better car accounting and availabil-
ity; reduction in the number of switching facilities and attend-
ant equipment.
c. Protective Conditions
The BN merger was accomplished only after substantial
compromise with and concession to opposing parties. It is vir-
tually impossible to measure the cost to the BN of the gate-
ways to the west coast given to the Milwaukee. The most ex-
pensive concession exacted from the merging lines was the pro-
tective labor agreement whereby the BN agreed not to terminate
the employment or force relocation of any union worker.83 A
criticism articulated but not stressed by merger opponents is that
the costs of such concesssions will neutralize whatever savings
the merger might have enabled. The argument has considerable
force since the labor concessions will admittedly cost the BN an
estimated $10.15 million annually for five years.84 This cost,
79. Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5(1) (1970), permits such
agreements.
80. Conant, Functional Mergers: Pooling and Trackage Agree-
ments, 47 MViNN. L. REv. 769, 776 (1963).
81. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 5(1), 5(2) (a) ( 1970).
82. This would be especially true where the particular company
controls the more favorable trackage grade.
83. 331 I.C.C. at 277.
84. The $10.15 million figure, however, may have been a conserva-
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however, will diminish as the number of employees diminishes
as a result of attrition. It is clear, however, that even the BN
estimate is conservative. Inflation and the inefficiencies re-
sulting from the retraining and geographic imbalance of em-
ployees mandated by the labor concessions have undoubtedly
added material costs. The concessions prohibit the line from
relocating hourly employees; thereby causing surpluses at some
points and deficits at others. Thus the protective conditions are
significant costs of the merger.
2. The Role of Competition: Intramodal
a. Introduction
The foremost challenge to the BN merger was based on the
claim that it would impair competition between the merged
lines. In the context of unregulated industries, mergers of two
major competitors would ordinarily be regarded as presump-
tively, if not per se, unlawful. Even in the context of regulated
industries, where government regulation has partly supplanted
competition, such a merger calls for close scrutiny. However,
under the conditions facing the railroad industry today, the con-
cern for competition must be informed by a realistic appraisal
of the limited and special character of competition in interstate
transportation. Such an appraisal casts considerable doubt on
the effectiveness of competition between railroads and on the
wisdom of using preservation of intramodal competition as a cri-
terion in judging the merits of rail mergers.
It is not possible here to examine the general role of com-
petition in the economy. Although the economic welfare con-
sequences of competition are not unambiguous, it is assumed
here that competition does promote efficiency in the production
and allocation of resources, and that, efficiency aside, competi-
tion promotes desirable social objectives."s The point of the
tive estimate in light of the fact that the agreements did not allow the
company to compel its hourly employees to relocate. Consequently,
labor imbalances, with shortages at some points and surpluses at oth-
ers, created an additional cost that must be added to the stated cost.
85. For a good summary see F. SCHERER, supra note 72, at 8-38.
The classic economic rationale of competition rests on its tendency
toward efficient output and allocation of resources: goods are produced
to the point of equality of marginal cost and demand price. In a
perfectly competitive system, resources will be allocated among produc-
tive uses in accordance with marginal value. For a rather elaborate
theoretical exigesis, see W. BAUMOL, WELFARE ECONOMICS AND TIE TiiE-
ORY OF THE STATE 64-134 (2d ed. 1965). A second rationale, somewhat
less abstractly theoretical, is that competition promotes productive and
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discussion here is not to challenge these widely held assump-
tions, but simply to question whether any of them identify gains
to be achieved by intramodal competition, and particularly, by
forbidding mergers which ostensibly reduce it. On the contrary,
to the extent that such mergers strengthen the railroads as in-
termodal competitors in the larger market of interstate trans-
portation, they will promote the interests of competitive effi-
ciency far more than retard them.
b. The Rail Industry
Competition in the railroad industry has not yielded the
normal benefits of the competitive market nor has it conformed
to the competitive norm. Rail lines do not engage in effecitve
intramodal competition."" Many rail lines operate in receiver-
ship and still others flounder on the brink of a similar fate, yet
they continue to operate against the very best rail lines.8 7 Rail
managerial efficiency quite apart from the allocative effects of ideal out-
put. See Leibenstein, Allocative Efficiency vs. "X-Efficiency", 56 AM.
EcoN. REv. 392 (1966). Among the several social benefits attributed to
competition, "distributional equity" is said to be promoted by the
elimination of monopoly "rents"-in effect shifting income from capital
to consumers. See F. Scnmm, supra note 72, at 19, 410. It is also
commonly said that competition promotes the decentralization of econo-
mic and social power. See, e.g., C. KAYsEN & D. TuRNER, ANwrrmus'r
Poracy 14-18 (1959).
All these defenses of competition have their weaknesses, both the-
oretical and practical. The efficiency of competition is subject to ex-
tensive theoretical qualifications in reference to the works of Baumol
and Scherer, supra. Even on the assumption that universal competi-
tion would be ideal, it has been demonstrated that, short of achieving
it, attempting to increase competitive conditions in parts of the econ-
omy may actually lead to greater misallocation in resources among
competitive and noncompetitive industries. See, e.g., Lipsey & Lancas-
ter, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24 REv. EcoN. STUDrns 11(1956). Moreover, competition may or may not promote greater tech-
nological innovation and progress, F. SCHEmm, supra note 72, at 363-78.
Here too the benefits are ambiguous; the redistributive effect does not
necessarily favor poor over rich even in relative terms (the "tax" on
the monopoly capital will often fall on investors who are earning no
more than an ordinary return on their investment, the monopoly
rents having long since been capitalized). Moreover, even where the
burden of redistribution falls on the creator of monopoly power, it is
not clear that "equity" always favors eliminating monopoly profit-
that depends on how it was gained. Id. at 19, 409.
86. For a complete discussion of the lack of rail competition, see
M. CONANT, supra note 3, 25-41.
87. Id. at 37. See also P. LocK=, supra note 2, at 388-494. Lock-
lin points out that under the present system weak roads are maintained
by artificially high prices which bear no relation to the cost of trans-
porting goods. While these high rates obviously do not benefit the
consumer, they do not benefit the rail industry either, because they re-
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service is highly variable; some lines provide fast and relatively
damage free service, while others provide slipshod and irregular
service. Yet carriers of both genres exist side by side, fre-
quently serving the same markets.8 8 Artificially high prices
established by the regulatory Commission do not reward effi-
cient operation nor penalize inefficiency.
Two reasons have been advanced for the present lack of
intramodal competition and for the assertion that ineffective
competition between rail lines is inevitable. First, the rail in-
dustry is a natural monopoly in which competition is inefficient
and ultimately unsuccessful. Second, both the structure of the
industry and the character of its regulation preclude all but the
most pro forma attempts of the lines to compete with each other.
Even the most ardent supporters of free market competi-
tion have quite generally acknowledged that an industrial struc-
ture that creates scale economies renders competition imperfect,
while very large scale economies can make it inefficient and ul-
timately impossible. In the latter case, the scale economies are
such that a single firm can supply the market at a cost signifi-
cantly below the costs of multiple, competitive firms. It is thus
said to be a "natural monopoly. ' '8 9 Under such circumstances,
particularly in local utility industries," it has been widely sup-
posed that economic regulation is necessary; competition is
wasteful because it generates excess capacity and inefficient pro-
duction. If a single firm can produce the output required by
the market at a cost significantly lower than competitive firms,
it should do so. Moreover, in such industries competition is not
merely wasteful and inefficient, it is ultimately not viable. On
the one hand, an existing firm may be able to expand output,
cut prices commensurate with diminishing marginal costs, and
ultimately drive competition from the market. On the other
hand, two or more firms may strive in this same manner until
move any incentive from the better lines to improve, since higher
profits will result only in a downward adjustment in rates by the
Commission.
88. One of the shippers interviewed in the preparation of this
Note indicated that of the four rail lines available to him, there was
as much as a 50% difference in "on time" records, with similar dis-
parities in claims service and damage. Interviews with major Twin
Cities Shippers, in Minneapolis, Minn., February 12-20, 1972.
89. See generally C. PImLLIPs, supra note 73.
90. Indeed there are few true examples of natural monopolies
found outside local utility services, which suggests that it is the re-
stricted size of the market that generally makes the requisite scale
economies possible. See J. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY
RATEs 12-13 (1961).
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they ultimately destroy each other by cutting prices down to
short term marginal costs, even though their pricing policy did
not recoup the full capital costs necessary to sustain the business
over the long term. The inefficiency and the ultimate frustra-
tion of competition under conditions of natural monopoly have
provided a traditional justification for regulation. 1
The central issue is whether intramodal rail transport bears
the natural monopoly characteristics that make extensive intra-
modal competition inefficient. At least given the traditional
structure of the industry, which dictates that each competitor
own and maintain separate tracks and other fixed investment,
a strong case can be made that competition requires wasteful
duplication of facilities 2.9 This is particularly so where the ben-
efits of competition can be assured through maintenance of
healthy intermodal competition, which itself may be strength-
ened by limiting intramodal competition.
It is also argued that intramodal competition is precluded
in the case of the rail industry, because of the physical structure
of the industry and because of regulatory constraints imposed
by the Interstate Commission. First, a carrier's need to rely on
other carriers to cooperate in the transportation of goods pre-
cludes competitive service improvements. 93  Because of the lack
of coast to coast and other long haul trackage even in the case
of the largest carriers,94 a single rail line is seldom able to
transport goods from a point of origin to a relatively distant
destination. It has been asserted, for example, that some trans-
continental shipments involve twenty different carriers.05 Thus
the most efficient carrier may often have to transfer goods to a
very inefficient line. Further, because these switching transfers
91. Whether the justification is fully persuasive is subject to
some doubt; certainly the substitution of regulation for competition is
not without costs and inefficiencies which themselves may be greater
than the adverse effects of monopoly. See Posner, Natural Monopoly
and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548 (1969). That problem is, how-
ever, beyond the scope of this Note. It is necessary only to point out
that the case for regulation is tenuous where the monopoly power is
limited by competition from other industries. The case of the rail-
roads is apposite. Whether or not regulation of the railroads was
initially justified by their natural monopoly characteristics (it has been
suggested that this was never the actual motive), the growth of com-
petition from other transport modes has undermined that rationale.
92. See M. CONANT, supra note 3, at 25-41.
93. For a thorough discussion of the barriers to intramodal com-
petition, see L CONANT, supra note 3, at 25-41.
94. Conant points out that the industry is severely fragmented.
Id. at 33.
95. Id. at 26.
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typically occur on twelve or twenty four hour intervals, a car-
rier desiring to outdo its competitor might have to deliver goods
to a connecting carrier as much as twenty four hours ahead of
a competing line. Given the short distances generally involved
in one segment of the carriage, a twenty four hour "jump" is fre-
quently not possible. Moreover, should one carrier become no-
ticeably competitive, connecting lines could easily sabotage its
efforts by slowing switching or transit. The "competitive" line
is often not in a position to choose an alternative connecting
carrier. Such competition-frustrating conduct is not unlikely
since one carrier may fear that another is establishing a com-
petitive standard it cannot meet for its own customers 0
Second, fixed roadbed and rights of way inhibit intramodal
competition since shippers are tied to the rail lines in their
area, just as carriers are wedded to the markets they serve. Un-
like the "start-up" requirements in many other industries, the
cost of constructing competing lines is prohibitive 7 even if the
right of way can be obtained." New construction can be under-
taken only after a certificate of public convenience and neces-
sity documenting the need for additional service has been se-
cured from the often recalcitrant Commission. 9
Finally and most significantly, the Commission's regulatory
policies prevent price competition by establishing, in effect, one
rate for all lines. 10 0
96. The railroads remember the severe rate wars of the industry's
early years. Even at that time, when no other source of transportation
was available for many shippers, lines went bankrupt with regularity.
See generally G. KOLKO, supra note 3, at 7-29 for a description of the
state of the industry at that time. The industry is not anxious to re-
peat that situation, and it is doubtful that the lines would engage in
competition even if it were feasible. In any case, the lack of willing-
ness to compete is merely one of many factors that make the notion
of intrarail competition a "myth."
97. One 1.91 mile extension of a rail line cost $231,000. See M.
CONANT, supra note 3, at 30.
98. Since today cities stand where empty prairie stood at the
time the present rail system was built, rights of way are not available
in any area where a railroad might wish to build a competing line.
99. 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1970). Such certificates are granted only
after the applicant has demonstrated a clear need for such additional
service. Such need has not frequently been shown in recent years. M.
CONANT, supra note 3, at 28-30.
100. The Commission has adopted a rate structure which sets min-
imum rates for all cargo. This floor on rates prevents competition on
a rate basis between the various railroads since they all must charge
the same rate for the same service. While a line is legally permitted
to charge more for its service, in practice the Commission minimum
has also become the ceiling. Given the rate structure alone, the lines
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Because of the necessity for interline carriage, rates must
be set cooperatively by the various lines. This is accomplished
by rate bureaus made up of the various carriers who pool infor-
mation as to cost and revenues.' 0 ' Any line seeking a rate in-
crease is subject to the scrutiny of the other bureau members.
Although the applicant line can appeal an adverse determination
of the rate bureau to the Commission, this is seldom done both
because the Commission gives great weight to the bureau's de-
termination and because compromise is more expedient. This
unofficial form of rate making is complemented by the Commis-
sion's policy of setting minimum rates at a level sufficiently high
to allow the least efficient carrier to remain in operation. The
net result of these two factors is an industry with very strong
pressure toward cooperation rather than competition in rate
making. The Commission also impairs service competition by
restricting entry and disallowing critical abandonments :02 which
would reduce costs and arguably yield revenues for service im-
provements.
Since the physical structure and constraints of the railroad
industry are not susceptible to change and restrictive regula-
tion of price and service is likely to continue, substantial com-
petition among railroads is a virtual impossibility.
c. The Northern Tier
The Northern Lines case illustrates some of the practical im-
pediments to intramodal competition. Prior to the merger the
Northern Tier states were served by the Great Northern, the
could compete by improving service, but other factors prevent this
sort of competition. See A. CONA1'T, supra note 3, at 30-32.
101. Rate bureaus are composed of rail carriers which fix ratesjointly for carriage involving two or more lines. Although the deter-
minations of these bureaus have no legal effect, they are typically ac-
cepted by the Commission when it approves or disapproves proposed
rates. As important as Commission acquiescence in this rate fixing
practice is the cooperation between the lines. Because each railroad
must share financial data regarding costs of operations, general finan-
cial condition, and proposed profits or losses, the ability to compete is
substantially reduced. The level of cooperation established by the con-
tinuing relationship of the lines in the bureaus fortifies the system of
collusion prevalent in the industry. See generally M. CONANT, supra
note 3, at 27, 30-31.
102. Barriers to entry are discussed in note 98 supra, and extens-
ively in M. CONAwT, supra note 3, at 28-30. The importance of new
entrants in a competitive system is discussed in note 85 supra. Re-
striction against abandonment of unprofitable rail lines and services
has the effect of drawing off much of the revenue needed to improve
profitable lines and services. See note 6 supra
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Northern Pacific, and the Milwaukee Railroads. The Chicago
and North Western served the eastern states of the Northern
Tier.
Initially, the facts demonstrate that the Milwaukee and
North Western prior to merger provided no real competition to
the Burlington, the Great Northern or the Northern Pacific.
The North Western was a regional railroad, ' " serving only the
states of Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minnesota in common
with the other lines. Because it carried mostly short haul
freight, the other lines possessed a clear advantage in their abil-
ity to offer both long and short haul service.
°1 0 4
The Milwaukee, too, was at a disadvantage because it had
no direct connection with the Southern Pacific, the Western
Pacific, or the Union Pacific Railroads, and because it could not
use alternate transcontinental through routes west of the Twin
Cities. It was therefore unable to participate in north-south traf-
fic along the West Coast. Routing restrictions greatly impaired
its ability to transport eastern originating freight to points in
the Dakotas and westward.'0 5 Because the Milwaukee had no
gateways to Portland, Oregon, the traffic from the Milwaukee's
points in Montana, Idaho, and Washington required three or four
separate hauls to points in Oregon, California, and British Colum-
bia, thereby frequently making it impossible for the Milwaukee
to compete with the Northern Lines for westward traffic from
that region. This disadvantage was reflected in poor volume.
Traffic density on the Milwaukee lines west of the Twin Cities
was one half that of the Northern Lines, notwithstanding the
fact that the Milwaukee actually possessed better track grades.
According to the Commission's First Report:
In the six states in which the Great Northern, Northern Pa-
cific, and Milwaukee each operated, in 1960 the Milwaukee
handled a smaller percentage of total ton miles for the state than
its percentage of total miles of road in that state. On the other
hand, the GN and NP both handled a greater percentage of ton
miles than their percentages of total miles of roads in those
states.1 0 6
103. "Regional" here refers to lack of access to the west coast from
the midwest.
104. Discussion of the Northwestern is omitted because it was not
as significant a competitor as the Northern Lines.
105. A complete discussion of the Milwaukee's shortcomings can
be found in 328 I.C.C. at 490-93. The restrictions also had secondary
adverse effects, most notably dual switching charges and delays for
freight not already excluded from the line because of its routing limi-
tations.
106. Id. at 490-91.
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The Milwaukee was also in a much weaker financial posi-
tion than the constituent lines. In the period 1951-1960, the Bur-
lington lost fifteen million dollars in traffic revenues, the Great
Northern lost two million dollars, and the Northern Pacific ac-
tually gained one million dollars. During that same period, the
smaller Milwaukee lost thirty million dollars on traffic reve-
nues, twice that of the Burlington, and fifteen times that of the
Great Northern.1'0 7 In 1965, for example, the Milwaukee had
net income of $7.3 million; the combined Northern Lines-Bur-
lington income for that year was $82 million.108 The Milwau-
kee has been plagued by financial difficulty since 1925. It was
driven into receivership that year, subsequently experienced de-
ficit operations in all but two years from 1926-1940, and has suf-
fered declining income from 1942 to the present.10 9
d. The Merger Participants
Although the impotence and continued presence of the Mil-
waukee and North Western attested a lack of effective intra-
modal competition, the more important question is whether ef-
fective competition existed between the merger participants. It
is readily apparent that if any two American railroads could
have engaged in meaningful competition, they were the Great
Northern and Northern Pacific. The physical structure of the
lines was somewhat conducive to bidding for customers in terms
of both services and prices. Although their tracks were some-
times as much as 100 miles apart, they were parallel at key
points.11 The financial structure of the lines would also have
facilitated service and price competition. Both were financially
solvent:
In 1966, the Great Northern had railway operating revenue of$281.1 million and net income of $36.5 million; the Northern
Pacific, $210.2 million in railway operating revenue and net in-
come of $23.8 million (331 LC.C. at 249-250). Each has long
107. Id. at 489.
108. Id. at 490-91.
109. Brief for Appellant, supra note 70, at 11.
110. The Commission found in its First Report that the lines were
competitive at points for approximately 43% of their gross revenues,
and 34% of their total tonnages. 328 LC.C. at 515. Upon rehearing, the
Commission found that the merger would not have any effect upon
88.28% of the applicants' stations, accounting for 60.73%, 66.59%, and
56.13% of cars, 66.59% of tonnage and 56.13% of revenues on the North-
ern Tier. Systemwide, the Commission found that there would be no
competitive effect at 91.58% of the applicants' stations accounting for
74.91% of its cars, 78.64% of total tonnage, and 68.59% of total revenues.
331 LC.C. at 272.
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enjoyed profitable operation. 'Burlington has not experienced
nor missed a dividend in 35 years. Great Northern has had
only 3 years (1932-34 inclusive) of deficit operations, and North-
ern Pacific only 2 (1932 and 1939) since 1926 . . . . Beginning
in 1942, applicants have been able to pay increasingly larger
amounts in dividends . . . .' 328 ICC at 489.111
Moreover, both lines were efficient and well managed, thus pre-
cluding ruination by the other in the event of competition. Since
the two lines ow-ned equal interests in the connecting carriers at
both ends of their parallel lines (the Burlington in the east, the
SP&S in the west), they could have competed on their long main
lines with the assurance that the connecting carriers would not
sabotage their efforts."12
Despite these conditions which were seemingly conducive to
vigorous competition, the Northern Lines were not strong com-
petitors.113 In fact, the lines generally emphasized the carriage
of different products; the Great Northern concentrating on grain
and agricultural products while the Northern Pacific carried pro-
portionately more lumber and ore. Shippers asserted that there
was often no difference in service between points served by
both roads and those points served by only one road, as there
presumably would have been had the lines been in active com-
petition with each other at those common points."
4
The most plausible explanation for the lack of competition
was, of course, the strong community of interest between the
lines.115 The Great Northern and Northern Pacific had been
pursuing a common goal for many years and had always been
desirous of merger. The result of the Northern Securities di-
111. Brief for Appellant, supra note 70, at 5.
112. The unusually long hauls used across the Northern Tier would
have facilitated competition between the two lines because either could
have completed a midwest to west coast shipment solely on facilities it
owned or controlled.
113. Although the lines did share common points at which compe-
tition was possible, neither line actively sought sustained competition.
Executives of the BN admitted that the management of both lines re-
alized that vigorous competition was not in their best interests. Re-
peated merger attempts and a community of ownership were the prin-
cipal reasons for this generally benign attitude. See text accompanying
notes 11-12 supra.
114. 331 I.C.C. at 274. Had there been substantial competition at
the common points, with resultant better service, violent objection to
the merger from shippers who stood to lose this competitive bargaining
tool could have been expected. As a matter of fact, shippers generally
supported the merger even before the protective conditions to the Mil-
waukee were granted. It is reasonable to assume that shippers ex-
pected to gain more from the merger than from continued separate
operation.
115. See notes 11-12 supra.
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vesture arrangement was to award ownership of the stock of
each railroad to the owners of Northern Securities stock regard-
less of which stock any individual stockholder had originally
contributed. As a result the same stockholders owned an inter-
est in each railroad. Subsequently the lines jointly purchased
the SP&S and the Burlington. Thus neither line had any incen-
tive to harm the other. In any case, the pricing system of the
Commission precluded price competition.
Before the merger, then, there was little effective competi-
tion on the Northern Tier, and in light of the firmly established
community of interest, and price and service restrictions im-
posed by the Commission, realistically none was likely.
e. Merger
While the merger has not eliminated any meaningful intra-
modal competition, neither has it facilitated such competition
as some proponents thought it would.110 The gateway conces-
sions granted the Milwaukee, making it a transcontinental line,
were predicted to increase intramodal competition on the North-
ern Tier, since the tier would be served by two "antagonistic"
lines. This argument fails principally because it identifies a
lack of gateways as the sole factor in the premerger weakness
of the Milwaukee. The poor financial condition of the Milwau-
kee had also hindered its ability to render service improvements
and new technologies, a factor which the gateways do not di-
rectly affect. Moreover, the theory fails to recognize the reality
of the situation of the new "competitors." The BN will pre-
sumably be stronger after the merger than the constituents were
together before it. Economies of scale and operational effi-
ciencies ought to yield better service and greater profit."17 Re-
ports from shippers indicate that the BN has already achieved
much more reliable deliveries, vastly improved claim service,
and better car availability."18 Such benefits are expected to con-
116. The Commission and the courts at least ostensibly expected
an improved Milwaukee to result from the merger and to intensify
competition as a result.
117. Concrete examples of the expected efficiencies were cited by
the Commission. 331 I.C.C. at 265. Fruit from the Yakima Valley will
reach Chicago 12 hours and Kansas City a full 24 hours sooner than it
would have before the merger. High volume, high powered freights
were expected to make the Chicago to Seattle trip in 82.5 hours after
the merger, while the same service required 94.5 hours prior to the
merger.
118. Shippers already report a line much improved in these re-
spects.
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tinue to improve as the merger potential is increasingly realized.
Against this stronger line, the Milwaukee has only new gate-
ways.
In its First Report, the Commission itself found that the BN
would offer service which the Milwaukee could not meet:
[Milwaukee cannot] provide the . .. quality of service made
possible by the proposed merger.
Finally, even if the Milwaukee were able to vie for freight with
the Burlington Northern, competition in the Northern Tier
would still be handicapped by the presence of uniform regu-
lated prices. 119 Hence it is apparent that the merger is not
likely to materially increase competition or measurably improve
the position of the Milwaukee vis a vis the new company. In-
deed, the Milwaukee's position has deteriorated to the point that
it now seeks entry into the BN. 120
It is nonetheless apparent that the Milwaukee gateway pro-
visions have resulted in a loss of some freight to the Burlington
Northern. This would have been relatively high profit freight
since it could easily be accommodated in underutilized cars with-
out significant additional cost. As such the gateway provisions
granted the Milwaukee only defeat some of the real efficiency
made possible by the merger.
3. The Role of Competition: Intermodal
With respect to intermodal competition two questions arc
important. First, does the trucking industry impose a competi-
tive burden on the rail industry? Second, are railroads effec-
tively competing with the trucks? The first question is impor-
tant in determining whether the Commission in considering a
merger should involve itself with intramodal competition. If
the trucking industry constitutes a significant threat to rail
carriage, there will be sufficient pressures on the lines to pro-
vide cheap and efficient service, thus rendering intramodal com-
petition unnecessary.121 The second question involves compara-
tive advantage. 122 Railroads theoretically have some cost or
119. See note 127 infra.
120. Permission for inclusion was requested on March 9, 1973. In-
terview with Milwaukee employee on May 4, 1973.
121. This is correct at least insofar as there is competition for the
same freight. Trucks do not constitute a significant threat for bulk
commodities such as iron ore.
122. "Advantage" is the ability of one subindustry to produce some
good or service at a lower cost than any other subindustry. Here the
lower cost producer will always be able to provide the good or service
at a lower price than other producers, and this is so because that
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service advantages that give them an edge in competition for
some goods. If the present system inhibits the exercise of that
preference, the reasons for, and the extent of, that inhibition are
important to the question of whether merger can help railroads
more effectively compete with the trucking industry.
The Commission's First Report argued that in this case the
trucking and rail industries had very little competitive rela-
tionship because of the very distinct type of goods carried by
each.123 Railroads in the Northern Tier generally make pre-
dominately long hauls of heavy loading, low value bulk commod-
ities while trucks generally carry higher value goods.
There are, however, several indications that the Commis-
sion's initial conclusions are simply not correct. First, and most
important, is the profit level of the Great Northern and North-
ern Pacific prior to merger. If the railroad industry faced no
competition from the trucking industry, one would expect rel-
atively high prices and profits among the rail lines, since de-
mand for transport was high on the Northern Tier and there was
no competition among the railroads. Independent of the truck-
ing industry, railroads were apparently in a position to be anti-
competitive and exploitative of monopoly conditions. However,
the profits of the two lines, although reasonable in each of the
16 years preceding merger, were clearly not exorbitant.12 4 The
competitive pressure of the trucking industry is at least one of
a number of likely explanations for the low level of profits of
the rail lines. Second, the assertion that the railroads and
trucks are two distinct industries because they transport differ-
ent goods ignores the fact that the basis for the goods differen-
tiation is to a large extent due to the Commission inspired
"value-of-service" pricing. 25
producer has some unique ability that the others cannot duplicate.
Within that subindustry, the normal competitive pressures would ap-
ply, so that only the most efficient producers would remain, but even
the less efficient would enjoy some advantage over those producers in
other subindustries. A good example of this situation exists in the
transportation industry. Railroads have so much more capacity than
trucks that they can carry goods at a much lower cost than trucks;
this is their "comparative advantage." Since trucks, on the other
hand, are not tied to fixed rails, they can deliver freight door to door,
while rails can offer such service only in those few cases where rails
and siding happen to go from the shipper to the consignee. Flexibility
is the trucks' comparative advantage. This concept will be developed
in detail, infra. See P. SA1UEIsON, ECONOmcs 605 (6th ed. 1964).
See also J. BAIN, PRICE THEORY 164-69 (1961).
123. 328 IC.C. at 510-11.
124. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
125. Value of service is that mode of pricing wherein the price
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Because that pricing system is not related to the cost of
providing service but rather to the value of the goods shipped,
it inevitably is disadvantageous to railroads vis-a-vis trucks. The
inherent flexibility of trucks allows them to compete success-
fully for the carriage of the most profitable goods, leaving rail-
roads to carry much less profitable cargo. Under a cost based
rate system, the railroad's inherent cost advantage in long haul
shipments would substantially outweigh the service advantages
possessed by trucks, and the railroads would capture much more
of the high value freight. It is apparent that the Commission's
imposition of "value-of-service" pricing, which results in higher
than cost pricing for high value goods, significantly contributes
to the artificial cargo differentiation which presently exists.
Third, the Commission argued that rails and trucks are sep-
arate industries because of the long haul cost advantage of rail-
roads. However, this argument ignores the fact that trucks have
to a significant degree minimized this advantage through the
ability to offer more rapid and flexible service.
Finally, the argument for the separability of the two indus-
tries founded on carriage of different types of goods for differ-
ent hauls also fails to consider the fact that no clear dichotomy
exists. There is a significant market of middle-value, middle-
haul freight for which trucks and railroads could actively com-
pete. Moreover, the evidence reveals that trucks are continuing
to compete successfully for such freight. Thus, contrary to the
position of the Commission, most economists agree that the
charged for transporting a good from one point to another is based upon
the demand for that good rather than the cost of transporting it.
Thus, goods with a relatively inelastic demand are "high value"
freight, whereas goods with a relatively elastic demand are "low value"
freight. A proportionally higher part of the price paid for a high
value item by the consumer will be attributable to transportation
cost because the consumer is willing to pay such an additional amount
as evidenced by the relatively inelastic demand for the good. This
system of pricing has enabled the trucking industry to compete selec-
tively with the railroads. Since by definition the highest price at
which a good will move from one point to another is the value of serv-
ice, the trucks have been able to compete for the high value freight by
offering faster service and thereby leaving the railroads with predomi-
nately low value freight such as grain. Hence, the situation now exists
in which trucks, with their relatively low fixed costs, have captured
most of the high priced freight, while the railroads, with very high
costs of operation, have been left with low value freight. See generally
P. LocKLIN, supra note 2, at 144-46. The Commission, in making or
adjusting rates, is charged to consider "the general and comparative
levels in market value of the various classes and kinds of commodi-
ties" shipped by the carrier. 49 U.S.C. § 55 (1970) (emphasis added).
See also 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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trucking industry does impose competitive pressure upon the
rail industry.1 26
On the other hand, that pressure has not spurred the service
improvements and efficiencies that would normally be expected
to flow from competition. One plausible explanation is that re-
duced profits and revenues resulting from the Commission's pol-
icy of forcing the railroads to maintain unproductive lines to
small communities results in low revenue for research and de-
velopment and replacement of worn equipment and facilities
with technologically advanced plant. Regardless of the cause of
the failure to eliminate inefficiency, it is apparent that trucks do
pose a competitive threat, and that as a result promoting com-
petition among railroads is less important than it otherwise
would be.
With respect to the second question, it is apparent that the
railroads are being outmaneuvered by the trucks even in those
areas where they have a clear comparative advantage. Theo-
retically, each transport mode possesses some unique advantages
that enable it to perform a particular service more efficiently
or at a lower cost than the other-a "comparative advantage."
Market forces would eventually cause the more efficient mode
to predominate over the less efficient mode in that service. It is
generally agreed that trucks possess a clear comparative ad-
vantage over railroads in shipments of less than one hundred
miles, and that the rails have a clear, and growing, advantage
for shipments in excess of two hundred miles.1"7 The advan-
tages are ascribed to differences in the costs necessary to "start
up" a shipment.1 28  Since trucks have lower fixed costs than
railroads, they reach a point where revenues equal fixed costs
much sooner than railroads.1 2 9 Railroads, however, have fewer
126. See J. MmExs, et al., Cov RrrlON iN Tm TR sPoRTATioN IN-
DusTY 184-86 (1964). See also A. FR LAENDER, THE Dn.mmA oF
FmGHT TRANSPORT REGULATiON 144-48 (1966). The same competitive
pressure that normally exists in the market would force the rail in-
dustry to abandon service where it could not effectively compete against
the trucks; such pressure would force the rails to improve efficiency or
lose more and more of the profitable freight.
127. J. MER et al., supra note 126, at 194-95.
128. "Start up" costs include the original capital investment in
equipment, a pro rata portion of terminals, administration expenses,
and the actual labor necessary to put the carrier in motion.
129. Trucks have very low fixed capital costs. The vehicle itself
and terminal buildings are the major expenses. However, the railroads
have enormous capital costs in slowly depreciating equipment, road-
bed and yards. Trucking labor costs are high once the truck is loaded
because the driver is paid by the mile. Once a train is composed,
much more freight is hauled per man hour of work than by truck.
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variable costs because of their larger hauling capacities. Thus
once the break even point is reached at approximately the 200
mile figure, the railroads have a clear comparative advantage
which grows as distance increases.
In spite of this, it has been estimated that over 91% of all
trucking shipments involve distances of over two hundred miles
-a service in which the rails have the natural advantage. The
direct cost to society in ignoring these inherent advantages has
been estimated to be as high as five hundred million dollars an-
nually. 13 0
Of course, this theoretical cost advantage in long haul car-
riage is dissipated to a great degree by the inefficiencies inherent
in the regulatory system. Commission policy forces costs to an
artificially high level by restricting the elimination of excess la-
bor and little used and duplicative routes. Start up costs are
thus driven higher for all rail operations, and the break even
point is increased. The long haul comparative advantage is fur-
ther reduced by the indirect cost subsidy given by the govern-
ment to the trucking industry. Although the trucking com-
panies pay substantial user fees for highway use, they are not
required to make capital investments to build the highways, nor
are they required to pay property taxes on them.'3 '
All the reasons for the railroads' failure to assert whatever
long haul cost advantages which remain are readily apparent.
First, even though railroads may have a long haul cost advan-
tage, they do not have long haul service parity with trucks.
Shipments from Chicago to Seattle generally take approximately
five days by rail but only two to three days by truck.13 2 The
truck shipment is also door to door, while the rail figure merely
reflects terminal to terminal time, so that still more time must
be added to the rail figure if the shipper or receiver of the goods
do not have spur tracks. While many shippers prefer the free
storage provided in the rail cars by these delays, most shippers
of high value, high profit freight prefer the faster service. 13
Second, the Commission's "value-of-service" pricing' 3 4 is
based not upon cost but upon the price the consumer is willing
130. A. FRDLAENDER, supra note 126, at 66. While there is some
question as to the actual figure, the losses are apparent.
131. A. Friedlaender concludes that there is considerable evidence
that the trucks do not pay the full cost of their use. Id. at 105-00.
There can be no doubt that they are spared the tax burden of widening
the roads.
132. Truckers can generally make the cross country trip over In-
terstate Highway 94 and average 40-50 miles per hour.
133. See note 55 supra.
134. See note 125 supra.
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to pay for the commodity transported. Value-of-service pricing
bears no relation to cost and may result in a price higher than
actual cost. Thus, where a railroad had costs of $2 for a long-
haul shipment and a truck $5, the railroad should capture the
freight because the $3 difference in price should outweigh the
value to a consumer of the service advantages provided by truck-
ers. Where price is not set by cost, the railroad's price may
reach $3.50. In such case the consumer may well be willing to
pay an additional $1.50 for the faster and more reliable service
provided by a trucker. 3 5
Transportation on the Northern Tier attests to the inferior
position occupied by the railroads. Although the Tier is an ideal
long haul market which should be well suited to railroad dom-
inance, the trucking industry has succeeded in capturing the
more lucrative freight. Most rail traffic on the Tier flows from
west to east and is largely comprised of low value and low rated
goods such as unfinished lumber and agricultural products, as
well as ores and minerals.136 Most high value, high rated freight
moves from manufacturing centers in the east and midwest to
the west. The trucking industry competes vigorously with the
rails for this westward business, generally capturing the lucra-
tive high value imported goods from West Coast seaports for
the return trip. 3 7
But for the rate structure and artificially high costs which
seriously impair the ability of the rails to compete, they would
be able to offer much lower prices for such lucrative freight
and capture a significant portion of it, notwithstanding the in-
herent service advantages offered by the trucks.
The Northern Lines merger will arguably improve the oppor-
tunity for intermodal competition by fostering service improve-
ments and by allowing the realization of substantial capital and
operational savings. It was argued that the merger would re-
sult in immediate service improvements because of the ability of
the new line to pool freight and thus operate more nonstop, long
haul, through, and unit train service, all of which would decrease
time and cost of shipment. It was also expected that the merger
would result in improved car availability, especially in peak
seasons, due to centralized car accounting and assignment.
The merger was expected to result in annual savings of be-
tween thirty-six and forty-six million dollars, to be achieved by
135. See note 122 supra.
136. Loving, A Railroad Merger that Worked, ForRTuN, August
1972, at 128, 130-31.
137. Id.
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the immediate consolidation of terminals, switching facilities,
rolling stock, and management, and by the gradual elimination
of unnecessary employees. These savings would greatly
strengthen the financial position of the new line and, it was ar-
gued, make available new sources of capital for modernization,
innovation, and service improvements. These in turn would gen-
erate new customers and increased business from existing cus-
tomers, all at the expense of the trucking industry.
The Burlington Northern asserts that the above service im-
provements and cost savings have come to pass. The average
time for cross country shipments has been cut from 92.5 hours to
87 hours. The line has announced a future service improve-
ments program including a one hundred million dollar, five-
year plan of constructing computerized yards.138 In 1972 alone,
the company expected to acquire railroad equipment and make
improvements to roadbed, structures and other items at an ag-
gregate cost of one hundred sixty million dollars. 139 The confi-
dence of the financial community in the new line was demon-
strated by the successful distribution of the first railroad equity
security offered since the 1950's a sixty-five million dollar,
5.25% convertible debenture offered by BN.
Each service and efficiency improvement will advance the
railroad's position vis a vis the trucks. As the railroad provides
more reliable service, it is better able to vie for the higher value
freight; each operational efficiency or savings that results in
higher earnings increases the financial ability of the BN to invest
in service improving innovations-which in turn increase com-
petitive ability.
In spite of these developments, the merger has resulted in
additional costs for the company. The labor concessions will
preclude immediate employee reductions that might have taken
place even without the merger. The gateway conditions granted
to the Milwaukee and the North Western divert freight previ-
ously awarded to the participants. Further, contemporaneously
with the merger, the long-haul capability of the trucks has been
greatly advanced by the construction of Interstate Highway 94
across the Northern Tier.
More importantly, the merger will not alleviate the more
basic problems underlying the Northern Lines' inability to cope
138. Burlington Northern Offering Circular for Equipment Trust
Certificates 9 (Dec. 1, 1971).
139. Burlington Northern Offering Circular for Convertible Deben-
tures 3 (Jan. 13, 1972).
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with intermodal competition. The trucking industry retains the
advantages of convenient door to door service, while fixed rates
preclude price competition. Moreover, the railroads are saddled
with artificially high costs due to the restrictions against aban-
donment, which may be all the more difficult to procure in
light of an improved profit picture.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Note was intended to identify the proper factors to be
considered in analyzing a railroad merger, particularly with re-
gard to the emphasis to be placed upon competition. It was also
intended to discuss whether mergers can solve the rail indus-
try's ills. Several key problems in the present plight of the rail
industry have been identified. Foremost among these is the past
and, to a lesser extent, present emphasis by the Commission
upon intramodal competition among railroads as a method of
achieving low cost, efficient service. This emphasis is costly
in that it results in substantial duplication of effort which is
unnecessary in view of the competitive pressure of the trucking
industry. Moreover, it is practically unworkable since the pres-
ent Commission price policy and the physical structure of rail-
roads precludes effective rail competition.
A second significant problem is the poor service record the
railroads have established as compared to the trucking indus-
try. One plausible explanation is that the lines do not have
sufficient revenues to upgrade their service capabilities. What-
ever the reason, the central fact is that the service problem ex-
ists. Finally there is the Commission rate making scheme and
general policy of prohibiting line abandonments. With a pricing
system based on costs rather than value of service, railroads
would undoubtedly be better able to exploit their inherent ad-
vantages in long-haul service. Moreover, the excessive costs of
maintaining unprofitable lines limit expenditures for service im-
provements.
Prospective mergers should be tested in light of and as po-
tential solutions to these problems. First, little weight should
be given to the preservation of intramodal competition. Rather,
the focus should be whether there is sufficient pressure from
other transportation modes to force merged lines to be efficient
carriers, and, if so, whether the merger will enable the partici-
pants to more effectively compete with other transport modes.
Two additional considerations of substantial importance are
the extent to which the merger will achieve cost savings and in-
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creased revenues, and whether those savings will result in in-
vestment for service improvement. It is not at all clear, as evi-
denced by the case of the Penn Central, that merger necessarily
results in savings and operational efficiencies. It may well be
that a merged railroad may be content to accept whatever prof-
its are available from the carriage of low value bulk goods, with-
out actively seeking freight in higher value goods presently car-
ried by trucks. The answer to the latter question may neces-
sarily depend on a case by case evaluation of the dynamics of
the companies involved.
It is somewhat futile to evaluate a merger in terms of
whether it may relieve the problems associated with Commis-
sion policy, since the impact in any case will not be significant.
A pricing system not tied to costs puts the railroads at a com-
petitive disadvantage with trucks, a disadvantage which the cost
savings and service improvements of a merger can only par-
tially alleviate. Moreover, the Commission's abandonment re-
strictions will continue to impose significant aritificial costs. In
determining a policy of rail abandonment, society may have to
choose between efficiency and availability of rail service to all
citizens and segments of the country. To the extent the latter
course is chosen, the railroads will never be fully competitive
and may even require subsidization. Mergers will arguably yield
cost savings, but they may represent a mere holding action.
On the basis of the above model, the approval of the BN
merger by the Commission and the Supreme Court appears to
be substantially correct. First, as to intermodal competition,
the evidence indicated that the trucking industry did represent
a competitive threat, that the railroads were at a distinct service
disadvantage, and that the merger would yield savings, effi-
ciences, and new technologies that would improve the line's posi-
tion with the trucks. The Commission and the Court were there-
fore correct in concluding that the merger was desirable in this
regard.
However, the plan of merger was incorrect insofar as it
emphasized intramodal competition and required gateways for
the Milwaukee. Effective rail competition is precluded after
merger as well as before because of uniform pricing policies
and because of the physical composition of railroads. To em-
phasize intramodal competition as a method of serving the con-
sumer is nonproductive. Further, even if it is sensible to foster
intramodal competition, it is apparent from the historical finan-
cial weakness of the Milwaukee, coupled with the superior serv-
1240 [Vol. 57:1201
1973] THE BURLINGTON NORTHERN MERGER
ice potential of the BN, that the Milwaukee was precluded at
the outset of the merger from providing meaningful competi-
tion. The protective provisions only reduce the savings the
merger may have yielded.
The merger was, of course, desirable in terms of the cost
savings and new technologies facilitated thereby. With the ben-
efit of hindsight, it is apparent that merger was the key to sub-
stantial cost savings and programs of technology and service
improvement, and that the management of the new company
was committed to competitive improvement.
On another level, approval was not only consistent with the
above model, but also with past precedent in McLean and Sea-
board. The decision reinforces Seaboard in that it emphasizes
intermodal rather than intramodal competition, not so much in
the written opinion itself as in the facts of the case. Two finan-
cially healthy, if not wealthy, lines which could have competed
to a significant degree were allowed to merge. In spite of the
fact that the lines carried substantial amounts of bulk goods
which no other transport mode could have captured, the truck-
ing industry was recognized as a sufficient competitive threat to
compel the merged lines to press for efficiency. To the extent
that Northern Lines moves the case law towards merger ap-
proval criteria which measure first, whether the merged line
will face intermodal competition and second, whether the merger
will facilitate more effective intermodal competition, it repre-
sents progress in attuning the law to economic realities. On the
other hand, insofar as the case emphasizes intramodal competi-
tion as a factor in the decision whether merger is in the public
interest, it widens the chasm between economic reality and the
law.
Although the BN merger is a moderately good example of
how mergers can alleviate some of the economic ills of the rail-
roads, its uniqueness cannot be underestimated, particularly in
light of the Penn Central experience. The constituent lines of
the BN shared a community of interest well before the merger
which helped immensely in the smooth transition into one large
firm. The Northern Lines were also healthy before the merger
and enjoyed a significant market of raw materials in which they
enjoyed a huge comparative advantage over the trucking indus-
try. Finally, the lines had much less unnecessary trackage than
most railroad lines. Thus, although the BN merger is indicative
of some of the potential benefits of merger in the railroad indus-
try, the particularly advantageous situations of the Northern
lines prior to merger should not be overlooked.
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